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Abstract This chapter outlines the practice of descriptive experience 
sampling (DES), a methodology with which Hubbub has experimented. 
Interdisciplinary DES experiments and workshops run during Hubbub’s 
residency brought collaborators together to explore the profoundly varied 
ways in which the resting state can be conceptualized, and the different 
forms that perspectives on aspects of inner experience might take.
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Researchers have become increasingly interested in characterizing psycho-
logical and neural states in the absence of any specific external stimulation. 
It is now widely recognized that a brain that is not engaged with any par-
ticular task demonstrates highly organized patterns of activity, resonating 
with the much longer established idea that a ‘resting’ mind is anything 
but still. Although different terminologies have arisen to describe psy-
chological states that are not focused on specific tasks (such as stimulus 
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independent thought, daydreaming, etc.), research has cohered around 
the dominant term mind wandering as a designator of the varied experi-
ences of a resting mind.i
Despite this growth of interest in mind wandering and the resting state, 
there have been few attempts to provide rich descriptions of the phenom-
enology (or ‘what it is like’ qualities) of resting cognition. One reason has 
been anxieties about the reliability of introspection, ranging from William 
James’ concerns about the reliance of introspection on memory,1 to cri-
tiques about the unreliability of participants’ self-reports on the causes of 
their actions.2 In attempts to avoid the methodological pitfalls of intro-
spection, participants are typically asked, through questionnaires, to 
report on what was in their experience during the few minutes of the 
so-called ‘resting-state’ scan (a procedure where participants are asked 
to lie in the brain scanner without performing any particular task). Such 
catch-all reports are unlikely to provide detailed information on the complex, 
multi-modal and dynamic patterning of the stream of consciousness, which 
is likely to vary considerably in its qualities from individual to individual. 
Another approach has been to present participants with random probes 
and ask them to report on their experience at the moment of the probe. 
Drawbacks of that method include its likelihood of disturbing the very 
experiences and neural activations under investigation, and the highly con-
strained nature of the response options available (e.g. making a simple 
choice between whether one’s attention was focused on the task or not). 
Such methodological limitations have meant that key questions about the 
phenomenology of resting-state cognition, such as the extent to which it 
has a verbal quality, remain largely unexamined.3
An alternative approach to characterizing a resting mind is to elicit 
more detailed descriptions of very specific moments of inner expe-
rience. However, extended and unguided introspective reports are 
open to various kinds of bias, including the effects of self-generaliza-
tions and self-theoretical attitudes. One method that acknowledges and 
tries to obviate such risks is descriptive experience sampling (DES). In 
this method, pioneered by the psychologist Russell Hurlburt of the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, the participant wears a small beeper 
attached to their clothing which delivers a series of random beeps to an 
earpiece worn in the ear. On hearing the beep, the participant’s task is 
to make brief notes about what was in their experience in the moment 
i See Chaps. 4 and 5.
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just before the beep’s onset. The participant then takes these notes along 
the next day to an in-depth interview with DES investigators, who inter-
view the participant in great detail about the moments of experience 
captured in the previous day’s sampling. At the heart of the method is a 
concern that asking people to report on their own experiences is as likely 
to elicit preconceptions about the nature of experience at least as much 
as it elicits any accurate reports on it.ii Crucially, DES involves an itera-
tive method in which participants are assumed to find the task difficult 
at the outset and accordingly not to produce accurate descriptions. Over 
repeated cycles of sampling and interviewing, however, participant and 
investigators establish a common framework for talking about that spe-
cific participant’s experiences, leading to increasing accuracy and focus 
of beep descriptions.4
Our involvement with DES research began when we started a collab-
oration with Hurlburt and the neuroscientist Simone Kühn at the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. Over the course of 
five weeks, we trained five volunteers as DES participants, first in their 
natural environment (going about their daily lives in Berlin) and next in 
the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. This represented the first 
time DES had been used in conjunction with neuroimaging.5 Each par-
ticipant underwent nine separate resting-state scans of 25 minutes each, 
resulting in a total of 225 minutes of resting-state functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) data for each participant. In addition, each 
participant reported on 36 randomly sampled DES beeps collected while 
they were undergoing the resting-state scan. We also asked participants to 
complete a standard questionnaire on their experience in the resting state, 
the ReSQ.6
The results of this study have been described by Hurlburt and col-
leagues.7 We found that people were generally quite consistent in what 
they reported in the resting state. There were considerable individual dif-
ferences, for example in the reporting of inner speech, and those differ-
ences were consistent across sampling sessions. We also found considera-
ble divergence between what people reported in DES and their responses 
on the ReSQ. This supports Hurlburt’s contention that questionnaires 
generally assess participants’ preconceptions about their experience at least 
as much as their actual experience: that is, people tend to fill in question-
naires on the basis of what they think their experience is like, rather than 
ii See also Chap. 11.
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how it actually is.iii Although our sample size was too small to allow the 
drawing of firm conclusions, it was interesting that the gap between DES 
and ReSQ responses narrowed as participants became more expert in the 
sampling process.
These endeavours led to the richest body of qualitative data currently 
available on the phenomenology of resting-state cognition. Here are a 
couple of examples:
Lara is looking at the edges of the scanner mirror – left bottom corner, 
and sees two of them, layering. Simultaneously she is hearing herself say, 
to no one in particular, ‘I really want to talk to you’. The voice is recog-
nized to be her own, expressed in her own natural way; however, the vocal 
characteristics are not of her own voice but of some female voice that she 
doesn’t  recognize. The wrongness of the vocal characteristics was noted 
only  retrospectively – at the moment of the beep, experientially, Lara simply 
hears herself talking. She knows who the ‘you’ is in this sentence, but the 
sentence is not directed to that person. She is also seeing her hands.
Susan innerly sees the actress Sigourney Weaver in a cryogenic tank from the 
movie Alien. She sees Sigourney’s face from above, below the glass window 
of the tank – the rest of Sigourney’s body is vaguely or blurrily present. 
Mostly Susan is searching for the word used in the movie: Cryogenic 
chamber, cryogenic tank, etc., waiting for the right word to appear. This is 
primarily a state of suspended animation, waiting for the word – she does 
not see or hear pieces of words, etc. 
Our study design also allowed us to address some specific questions about 
the verbal nature of resting-state cognition. Covert self-directed speech 
(known as inner speech) is known to be reasonably frequent in the resting 
state, with one study reporting that 90 per cent  of participants engaged 
in it.8 In addition to classifying DES beeps according to whether they 
involved inner speech or not, we incorporated a standard inner speech 
elicitation paradigm, in which participants had to generate covert utter-
ances in the scanner. Spontaneous and elicited inner speech related to 
strikingly different patterns of neural activation, casting doubt on the 
reliability of elicitation paradigms for this and other forms of mental 
experience.9 In other words, asking people to have a particular experi-
ence in the brain scanner is no guarantee that they will do so, or at least 
iii See Chap. 8.
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that what results will bear much resemblance to the naturally occurring 
phenomenon.
One strength of DES is its capacity to describe states of experience that 
may be experienced by only a minority of participants – or which may even 
be unique to one individual.iv Such idiosyncratic states of consciousness are 
by definition very difficult to capture in self-report questionnaires. While 
DES studies often describe phenomena occurring in the common modali-
ties of visual imagery, inner speech, unsymbolized thought, sensory aware-
ness and feelings (what Hurlburt has termed the five frequent phenomena), 
the method also allows the creation of new categories if these are the best 
ways of describing a specific participant’s experiences. For example, DES 
studies have shown that people’s descriptions of inner speech take two 
forms: inner speaking and inner hearing. In inner speaking, the partici-
pant has the experience of being the producer of the speech that is experi-
enced. In inner hearing, by contrast, the sense is more of being the recip-
ient of the produced speech. One of our participants, Lara, showed this 
less common form of inner hearing, and it occurred frequently enough in 
her DES samples for us to compare these two forms of inner speech in a 
single-case design.10
DES is not a perfect method, and there are several grounds for caution. 
First, it has been argued that the act of observation inevitably changes the 
event itself: either in the sampling moment, or as a result of the series of 
interviews that follow the sampling session.11 Second, bridging the delay 
between the collection of samples and the interview relies on participants 
being able to adequately remember enough about their experiences to 
report them accurately. Hurlburt has argued that variations in the time 
between beep and interview have made little difference to the reports he 
collects, as long as the delay is less than 24 hours Also important is the 
fact that notes on the sampled moment are taken immediately, with the 
iterative process aiming to ensure increasingly greater fidelity and focus 
of note-taking as the sampling process unfolds. However, such issues 
around whether observing and reporting may affect moments of experi-
ence remain a lingering concern, and one that can likely only be unpicked 
through further empirical research.
The various strengths and weaknesses of DES have been discussed in 
depth by Hurlburt elsewhere, especially with the sceptical philosopher Eric 
iv See Chap. 15.
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Schwitzgebel.12 Notably, while Schwitzgebel is doubtful about the possi-
bility of any kind of accurate introspection, he concludes that DES is nev-
ertheless the most high-fidelity method for investigating inner experience 
currently available. Indeed, many of the criticisms levelled at DES could 
also be directed towards other, more superficial self-report methods: if 
introspection is a problem for DES, then a much larger swathe of psycho-
logical research faces similar problems.
Notwithstanding such concerns, we argue that DES represents an alter-
native methodology for investigating inner experience that can comple-
ment and enhance existing neuroscientific methods.13 The richness of the 
data it provides also allows for current models of mind wandering and 
resting-state cognition to be tested against one another. One focus of 
our research in Hubbub has been on drawing on collaborators’ expertise 
in mind wandering and the resting state to put such models to the test. 
In ongoing work, we are recoding the resting-state sampling vignettes 
from our Berlin study according to whether they appear to be primar-
ily internally directed, or initiated by events in the external environment. 
This allows us to test a cognitive neuroscientific model of how the brain 
switches between internally and externally stimulated thought, opening 
such models up to new kinds of qualitative data.14
Future research will also extend the investigation into overlap between 
resting-state cognition and inner speech. In terms of its neural bases, inner 
speech activates a particular network of regions primarily in the left hem-
isphere of the brain. One question of interest is how language plugs in to 
the dynamic system that coordinates switching between on-task and task-
free cognition.15 Another focus is the idea that verbal mind wandering 
involves a more abstract form of inner speech, while more voluntary inner 
speech has a more concrete or expanded form.16 This exemplifies one of 
the ways in which a focus on new kinds of qualitative data can open up 
novel research questions about the resting mind and brain.v 
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